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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the court commited reversible error in 
refusing defendant Pursifell's request that he not have to 
proceed with the court-appointed defense counsel. 
2. Whether or not the performance of the court-appointed 
defense counsel was such that defendant Pursifell received inef-
fective assistance of counsel violating his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 18, 1986 at approximately 3:40 a.m., Jason Frampton 
awoke and discovered an intruder in his room at 2785 West 4682 
South, West Valley (T.18). Upon Jason's awakening, the intruder 
left. Jason awakened his father (T.20) and it was discovered 
that some money and a calculator were missing from Mrs. 
Frampton's purse. The family then called the police. After 
calling the police they discovered that both of their automobiles 
had been entered and the glove boxes opened (T.21). Some cash 
was missing from Jason Frampton's car (T.22) and a key to the 
house was missing from Mr. John Frampton's car (T.40). At 
approximately 4:00 a.m. Dave Trijillo awakened to an intruder 
attempting to enter his home at 4233 South 2735 West, West 
Valley, Utah (T.64-65). The intruder left without entering the 
home. Dave Trijillo then called the police. Shortly after the 
Framptons called the police, the police brought two different 
suspects to the home of Jason Frampton. The second of these was 
the defendant, Rick N. Pursifell, who was tentatively identified 
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by Jason Frampton as the intruder (T.34). The defendant was also 
taken to Dave Trijillo's house and identified by him as the 
intruder (T.69). The defendant was then arrested and taken into 
custody. He was charged with six counts: 1. Burglary, Second 
degree, with respect to the Frampton's house; 2. Attempted 
Burglary, a Third degree offense, with respect to the Trijillo 
residence; 3. Vehicle Burglary, a Class A misdemeanor, for the 
vehicle of John Frampton; 4. Vehicle Burglary, a Class A mis-
demeanor, for the vehicle of Jason Frampton; 5. Theft, a Class B 
misdemeanor, for the money taken from the vehicle of Jason 
Frampton and 6. Theft, a Class B misdemeanor, for the money taken 
from Mrs. John Frampton. 
On March 13, 1986, Frances M. Palacios entered an appearance 
of counsel for defendant Pursifell. On May 29, 1986, defendant 
Pursifell was brought to trial on all six counts. Upon entering 
the courtroom, defendant voiced an objection to being represented 
by Ms. Palacios. He indicated that he didn't wish to continue 
with Ms. Palacios because he didn't feel that she had done 
everything she could in his case (T.3). He had spoken with her 
once and she filed a motion to discover which he had no notice of 
until two days after the hearing. The hearing was set for April 
14, 1986 and the notice sent to the defendant did not reach the 
mail room in the prison until April 15, 1986. The Defendant did 
not receive the notice until April 16, 1986. The information 
which was the subject of the discovery motion was supplied to 
Ms. Palacios on the 9th of April, 1986, making the hearing on the 
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defendant's discovery motion pro forma (T.6). Judge Frederick 
denied defendant's motion and the trial proceeded with Ms. 
Palacios representing defendant (T.6), 
The defendant was found guilty on all six counts on April 
30f 1986 and was sentenced to 1-15 years on Count 1; the indeter-
minate term provided for by law on Count 2; 1 year on Count 3; 
one year on Count 4; Six months on Count 5; and Six months on 
Count 6. All terms were to run consecutively to the term defen-
dant was presently serving and concurrently with each other. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On the morning of the appellant's trial, the appellant 
informed the court that he wished to dismiss court-appointed 
counsel because the appellant felt that she had not done 
everything that she could to assist the appellant with his case. 
Although the appellant was less than articulate in explaining and 
detailing his complaints with regard to court-appointed counsel, 
the trial court failed to inquire thoroughly into the appellant's 
dissatisfaction with counsel or to inform appellant of his option 
to proceed pro se. The failure of the trial court to fully 
explore the appellant's dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, 
and the trial court's additional failure to inform the appellant 
of his option to proceed pro se violated the appellant's Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Appellant also contends that court-appointed counsel ren-
dered ineffective assistance in the presentation of his defense, 
and thereby violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective 
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assistance and counsel. This claim is based in part upon minimal 
contact between the appellant and court-appointed counsel prior 
to trial. The claim is also grounded upon the failure of 
appointed counsel to challenge: 1) the propriety of the 
appellant's initial detention on the evening of his arrest; 
2) the unnecessarily suggestive show-up which tainted the 
reliability of the identification of the appellant by the two 
witnesses who did identify him; and 3) the failure of appointed 
counsel to impeach the identification testimony of one of the 
witnesses with a prior inconsistent statement which had been made 
to the police on the evening that the witness tentatively iden-
tified the appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
REFUSING DEFENDANT'S REQUEST THAT COURT-
APPOINTED DEFENSE COUNSEL BE DISMISSED. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provi-
des: 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public 
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by lawf and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 
This language has been read to include the right of indigents to 
appointed counsel in felony prosecutions, Gideon v. Wainwright, 
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372 U.S. 335f 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963)f the right to 
self-representation, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 
2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1974) and the right to effective assistance 
of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct 
1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Birt v. Montgomery, 725 
F.2d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Sixth amendment right 
to counsel has four components: right to have counsel, minimum 
quality of counsel, a reasonable opportunity to select and be 
represented by chosen counsel and right to preparation period 
sufficient to assure minimum quality counsel); Gandy v. Alabama, 
569 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978). The United States Supreme 
Court in Faretta, supra, said the following: 
"The language and spirit of the Sixth 
Amendment contemplates that counsel, like 
the other defense tools guaranteed by the 
amendment, shall be an aid to a willing 
defendant. * * * To thrust counsel upon the 
accused, against his considered wish, thus 
violates the logic of the Amendment. In 
such a case, counsel is not an assistant, 
but a master; and the right to make a 
defense is stripped of personal character 
upon which the Amendment insists. * * * 
An unwanted counsel 'represents1 the 
defendant only through a tenuous and 
unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the 
accused has acquiesced in such representa-
tion, the defense presented is not the 
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, 
for, in a very real sense, it is not his 
defense. * * * 
But it is one thing to hold that every 
defendant, rich or poor, has the right to 
the assistance of counsel, and quite another 
to say that a State may compel a defendant 
to accept a lawyer he does not want. The 
value of state-appointed counsel was not 
unappreciated by the Founders, yet the 
notion of compulsory counsel was utterly 
foreign to them. And whatever else may be 
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said of those who wrote the Bill of Rights, 
surely there can be no doubt that they 
understood the inestimable worh of free 
choice." 
Thus, a defendant cannot be forced to accept counsel which 
is unacceptable to him, except perhaps in extreme cases. The 
defendant must be given a free choice with respect to defense 
counsel. This does not mean that an indigent defendant has an 
absolute right to choose his counsel. His counsel will still be 
appointed by the state. A defendant does not have an absolute 
right to counsel of his choice, if he is an indigent defendant. 
An indigent has a much more limited right to counsel than does a 
defendant who can afford to pay for his choice of counsel. 
However, in certain cases, court-appointed counsel must be 
replaced at the request of the defendant. It is within the 
discretion of the trial court to determine whether or not to 
substitute court-appointed counsel. In the case of People v. 
Walker, 555 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1976), the defendant requested, prior 
to trial, that there be a substitution of counsel. He based his 
request on the fact that counsel had not consulted with him suf-
ficiently to prepare properly for trial and on various other 
disagreements with counsel's decisions. The court denied the 
motion. 
"It is a matter of judicial discretion whether 
to substitute court-appointed counsel in the 
absence of a sufficient showing that a defendant's 
right to counsel would otherwise be substantially 
impaired. (Citing cases). Defendant's initial 
refusal in the instant case to cooperate with 
appointed counsel by itself was not sufficient 
cause to require substitution of counsel (Citing 
cases), and there appears to be no abuse of the 
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trial court's discretion or impairment of 
defendant's right to the assistance of effective 
counsel." 
There are certain reasons which form a sufficient basis for 
discharge of a court-appointed attorney and appointment of a new 
attorney. These reasons are discussed in the case of McKee v. 
Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (Second Cir. 1981). In that casef the 
defendant requested on the first day of trial that new counsel 
be assigned to him. The judge refused this request. Upon 
appeal, the court stated that a defendant must show good cause in 
order to have his counsel replaced. 
"It is settled in this Circuit that f[oJnce 
trial has begun. . . a defendant does not have 
the unbridled right to reject assigned counsel 
and demand another.' (Citing cases) This court 
has long recognized that certain restraints 
must be put on the reassignment of counsel lest 
the right be 'manipulated so as to obstruct the 
orderly procedure in the courts of to interfere 
with the fair administration of justice.• 
(Citing cases) Therefore, '[i]n order to warrant 
a substitution of counsel during trial, the 
defendant must show good cause, such as conflict 
of interest, a complete breakdown of communica-
tion or an irreconcilable conflict which leads 
to an apparently unjust verdict.'" 
The Eighth Circuit discussed the situation where substitu-
tion of counsel is appropriate and/or necessary in the case of 
IJ!}i^ §l-States y^^Hart, 557 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1977). In that 
case, on the day of trial, the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss his appointed counsel. The court denied this request but 
on appeal the Circuit Court discussed what sorts of situations 
require substitution of counsel: 
"We have no quarrel with the proposition, 
urged by the defendant, that an accused who 
is forced to stand trial with the assistance 
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of appointed counsel with whom he has become 
embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict is 
denied effective assistance of counsel. 
(Citing cases) The trial court, when con-
fronted by such an allegation, has an obli-
gation to inquire thoroughly into the 
factual basis of the defendant's dissatifac-
tion (Citing cases). However, in this case, 
the district court afforded Hart every 
opportunity to demonstrate a basis for the 
alleged irreconcilable conflict between 
himself and his attorney." 
The determination of whether or not to substitute counsel 
lies within the discretion of the trial court, but only after 
thorough questioning into the defendant's dissatisfaction. If 
the defendant is not thoroughly questioned, there is no basis for 
the trial court to exercise its discretion in granting or denying 
a defendant's request for substitution of counsel. 
The duty which rests in the trial court to examine the 
attorney-client relationship as soon as the defendant expresses 
any dissatisfaction with it and to examine it thoroughly is a 
very serious duty. In the case of White v. White, 602 F.Supp. 
173 (MO. WD 1984), the defendant requested several times that his 
counsel be replaced. The basis of his complaints was that the 
counsel who had been assigned to him was overworked and had, 
therefore, failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence 
that a competent attorney would perform under similar circumstan-
ces. The court was of the opinion that when an accused is forced 
to stand trial with the assistance of appointed counsel with whom 
he has become embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict, the 
accused is denied effective assistance of counsel. 
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"The trial court, when confronted by such an 
allegation, has an obligation to inquire 
thoroughly into the factual basis of the 
defendant's dissatisfaction. If an attorney 
and a client have an irreconcilable conflict, 
essential attributes of a healty attorney-
client relationship are non-existent. * * * 
. . . a careful examination into the nature 
of the disagreement, its duration and the 
impact it would have on the conduct of the 
defense should have been conducted. . . Had 
the reasons for the conflict been fully 
explored, the air might have been cleared. 
On the other hand, the completeness of the 
rift between the two might have been 
established. . . Under the circumstances, 
petitioner need not show that he was actually 
prejudiced by the irreconcilable conflict 
with his counsel. Prejudice should be pre-
sumed from a fractured attorney-client 
relationship just as it would be if the 
petitioner had been denied the assistance 
of counsel." 
The Alaskan Court, in the case of Smith v. State, 651 P.2d 
1191 (Alaska App. 1982), reinforced the importance of questioning 
the defendant with respect to his dissatisfaction with his court-
appointed defense counsel. In that case, the defendant requested 
that the court allow him to replace the court-appointed attorney 
with an attorney of his own choice. The court, despite the 
"obvious animosity" of the defendant for the court-appointed 
counsel refused the request and never questioned defendant as to 
the reasons for his unhappiness. The court forced the defendant 
to choose between being represnted by the court-appointed counsel 
and representing himself. 
"Despite the obvious animosity on Smith's 
[defendant's] part toward Ravin [defense 
counsel], the court never questioned Smith 
or Ravin to determine whether there was a 
reasonable basis for Smith's dismissal of 
Ravin; nor did the court inquire as to 
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whether Ravin thought that there was a 
sufficiently serious breakdown in his 
attorney-client relationship with Smith 
to preclude him from continuing to act 
effectively as Smith's legal counsel." 
Even if substitution is not required, the defendant who does 
not wish to continue with court-appointed counsel is still left 
with two choices; continuing with counsel regardless of his 
complaints or representing himself. These choices must be made 
clear to the defendant states the Third Circuit court in the case 
of Onited^tates^y.^Welt^, 674 F.2d 185 (3rd Cir. 1982). 
"Wheref on the eve of trial, a defendant seeks 
new counsel, or, in the alternative, opts to 
represent himself, the district court must 
engage in two lines of inquiry. First, the 
court must decide if the reasons for the 
defendant's request for substitute counsel 
constitute good cause and are thus sufficiently 
substantial to justify a continuance of the 
trial in order to allow new counsel to be 
obtained. If the district court determines 
that the defendant is not entitled to a con-
tinuance in order to engage new counsel, the 
defendant is then left with a choice between 
continuing with his existing counsel or pro-
ceeding to trial pro se, thus bringing into 
play the court's second stage of inquiry. * * * 
It is vital that the district court take 
particular pains in discharging its responsi-
bility to conduct these inquiries concerning 
substitution of counsel and waiver of counsel. 
Perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. 
This is true even when the trial judge strongly 
suspects that the defendant's requests are 
disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate 
the judicial process and to delay the trial. 
Although such improper tactics by an accused 
cannot be allowed to succeed, at the same time, 
a trial cannot be permitted to go forward when 
a defendant does not fully appreciate the 
impact of his actions on his fundamental con-
stitutional rights. 
When a defendant requests a substitution of 
counsel on the eve of trial, the district court 
must engage in at least some inquiry as to the 
reason for the defendant's dissatisfaction with 
his existing attorney. * * * 
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If the district court has made the appropriate 
inquiries and has determined that a continuance 
for substitution of counsel is not warranted, 
the court can then properly insist that the 
defendant choose between representation by his 
existing counsel and proceeding pro se." 
When Defendant Pursifell informed the court that he wished 
not to proceed with defense counsel, Judge Frederick failed to 
inquire thoroughly into defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel 
or to inform him of his option to proceed pro se. Defendant's 
request is found on page 3 of the transcript: 
Mr. Pursifell: It's that I don't wish to 
proceed with Ms. Palacios, because I don't 
feel she's done everything that she could 
in my case. 
The Court: In what specific way hasn't she 
represented your interest? 
Mr. Pursifell: I feel that she hasn't 
altogether got my case together right, and I 
feel that if I proceed with Ms. Palacios, that 
it's not going to be fair for me to go to 
trial with her. I have talked to her once 
before she just closed information or a Motion 
to Discover, and I didn't know she was going 
to do so that. I got a letter in the mail 
saying she did that two days after the hearing 
happened, and I feel that before she done that, 
I should have been notified of what she was 
doing. . . 
The rest of the discussion centered on Mr. Pursifell's knowledge 
of that hearing. There was no further discussion of Ms. 
Palacios' knowledge of the case, meetings with the defendant or 
any other dissatisfaction Pursifell may have had with Ms. 
Palacios. The court, after discussing the defendant's notice 
with respect to the Motion to Discover determined that Ms. 
Palacios "has done a very good job with regard to representing 
your interests in this matter. She's proceeded in an orderly 
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fashion, as is my experience, in her efforts on criminal defense 
cases. Your motion, therefore, to terminate her services in this 
matter and to continue the trial is denied." The trial then con-
tinued. There was never any mention of defendant's option to 
proceed pro se, nor was there any further inquiry into any other 
problems defendant may have had with Ms. Palacios. There was 
some indication that Ms. Palacios had only communicated with 
defendant once prior to trial, but that matter was never probed 
by the trial court. The matter was not discussed again. The 
failure of Judge Fredericks to fully explore defendant's dissatis-
faction with appointed counsel, and his failure to inform defen-
dant of his option to proceed pro se violated defendant's Sixth 
Amendment right to efficient counsel. 
POINT_II 
THE PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS SUCH 
THAT DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
VIOLATING HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution not 
only guarantees a defendant the right to counsel but, as men-
tioned in Point I, it also guarantees that indigent defendants 
will be appointed counsel by the state for felony trial, Gideon 
v. Wainwright, supra, and that the assistance of counsel must be 
effective to meet Sixth Amendment standards, McMann y. Richardson, 
supra. Even if a defendant had state-appointed counsel, in order 
for the demands of the Sixth Amendment to be met, that counsel 
must render effective assistance. In order to determine whether 
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or not the assistance given by defense counsel was "effective", 
we must look to the services rendered. The Supreme Court of Utah 
has discussed the question of effectiveness of counsel in several 
cases. One of the earliest of these cases is State v. McNicol, 
554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976). In that case, defendant was on trial 
for the crime of murder in the second degree. After his trial, 
he appealed on the grounds that his representation by appointed 
counsel was so inadequate as to violate his right to counsel as 
guaranteed by Article 1, Section 12, Constitution of Utah, and by 
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, United States Constitution. 
The defendant based his appeal on the fact that: 1) the trial 
was very brief, 2) defense counsel assserted very few objections, 
3) the direct examination of defendant was brief and failed to 
cover areas which might relate to possible defenses, 4) defense 
counsel did not pursue certain matters which defendant felt he 
should have pursued and 5) defense counsel asserted no objection 
to the twenty exhibits introduced into evidence. The court had 
this to say: 
"This court has previously held the right 
of the accused to have counsel is not satis-
fied by a sham or pretense of an appearance 
in the record by an attorney who manifests no 
real concern about the interests of the 
accused. He is entitled to the assistance of 
a competent member of the Bar, who shows a 
willingness to identify himself with the 
interests of the accused and present such 
defenses as are available under the law and 
consistent with the ethics of the profession." 
The question of whether or not a defense counsel has ren-
dered ineffective assistance is not simply answered by looking at 
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defendant's satisfaction with defense counsel. Defense counsel 
must fail to represent defendant's interests. In the case of 
State^v^^Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977), the Court makes this 
very clear. In that case, the defendant complained on appeal of 
the assistance of counsel: 
"The mere assertion of such a charge does 
not prove che fact. This is especially so 
because the assertion is suffused with such 
self-interest that the trial court is not 
bound to believe it." 
One area where counsel can be shown to be deficient is in 
the area of objections. Where counsel fails to make crucial and 
necessary objections, the interests of the defendant are cer-
tainly not represented. However, where the objections would be 
futile, they are not an appropriate basis for the finding of 
ineffective assistance. 
"In State_v._GraXr Utah, 601 P.2d 918 (1979), 
we held that the accused has a right to effec-
tive counsel who does more than satisfy a 
pretense of representation. We stated that the 
defendant bears the burden of establishing 
ineffectiveness. The proof must be demonstrable, 
not speculative. * * * In Heinlin v. Smith, 542 
P.2d 1081 (1975), we held that the failure of 
counsel to make motions or objections which would 
be futile if raised does not constitute ineffec-
tive assistance. 
* * * The trial court found the admission of 
expert testimony based upon official weather 
reports was 'clearly admissible as an exception 
to the hearsay rule. ' We agree. It is there-
fore understandable why trial counsel made no 
objection. Effective representation does not 
require counsel to object when doing so would 
be futile. (SJtate_v^J4almrose, 649 P. 2d 56, 
Utah 1982). 
Defense counsel, in the case at hand, barely presented a 
defense. Her only actions in court were to give a two page 
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opening statement, make five objections during testimony and 
cross-examine the prosecutor's witnesses. Her actions before 
the trial include being entered as counsel, requesting relevant 
information from the prosecutor, filing a Motion to Discover when 
the information was not received, requesting that the trial be 
rescheduled, and submitting three requested instructions. The 
day of trial, the defendant requested that defense counsel be 
replaced. His request was denied perfunctorily. 
Other oversights on the part of the defense counsel include 
failure to object and failure to introduce necessary evidence. 
When cross-examining Jason Frampton, Ms. Palacios attempted to 
impeach his testimony with regard to the length of time he had to 
view the intruder in his home. On page 28 of the transcript she 
asked the witness: 
Q. Now, do you recall giving a statement to 
the police officer about what you saw? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall telling him that at the 
time that the person was at the door, that 
he immediately ran? Do you recall telling 
him that, that the suspect immediately 
turned and began to run? 
A. He immediately turned after I said hello 
to him. 
Q. But my question was, do you remember 
telling him that? 
A. I don't remember telling him that. 
At that time, it would have been logical for defense counsel to 
have introduced the inconsistent statement made by Jason Frampton 
to the police to impeach his testimony regarding identification. 
Counsel never attempted to introduce the statement and demonstrate 
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the difference in his statement and his testimony at trial. 
On page 41 of the transcript, John Frampton repeated what he 
had overheard his son say to the police during Jason's iden-
tification of defendant. Ms. Palacios failed to object to the 
evidence as hearsay. There was no objection when Mrs. Frampton 
also repeated what she had heard her son say to the police when 
identifying the defendant. On page 62, during Dave Trijillo's 
testimony, he made references to the fact that a short time 
earlier, "we just had another robber come in our house and try to 
rape my little sister." No motion was made by Ms. Palacios to 
strike the statement as prejudicial or have the jury instructed 
to ignore the statement. 
Ms. Palacios failed to file a pretrial motion challenging 
the lawfulness of the initial detention of the defendant by the 
arresting officers. Ms. Palacios also failed to file any 
pretrial motion to exclude the identification of the defendant on 
the grounds that it was unnecessarily suggestive. She also 
failed to object at trial to the identification of the defendant 
notwithstanding that 1) the police informed both witnesses who 
identified the defendant that he had been found in the area; 
2) the defendant was identified while in police custody and alone; 
and 3) there was no line-up. Although David Trijillo testified 
that there was a chance that the defendant had touched the glass 
doors of his home, he did not recall that any fingerprints were 
taken. No questions were asked by defense counsel during her 
cross-examination of the police officers involved why no 
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fingerprints were taken, or in fact, if any were taken. 
As stated by defendant during his request for different 
defense counsel, defense counsel only spoke to the defendant 
once prior to trial. He was not informed of counsel's actions. 
Under these circumstances, defense counsel's assistance to defen-
dant was ineffective and therefore violated his right to counsel 
as protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 12, Constitution of 
Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant's convictions should be reversed and he 
should be granted a new trial. 
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